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Professor Wofford’s paper is an interesting and helpful contribution to the study of 
metaphor. His self-proclaimed pragmatic test of Donald Davidson’s account of metaphor 
is clear, focused and tightly constructed. Professor Wofford’s conclusions regarding the 
nature of metaphor are intriguing and suggestive. 
 There are a couple of key moves in Professor Wofford’s account of metaphor that 
I find particularly interesting. Drawing upon the pragmatist tradition, Professor Wofford 
suggests that to fully understand what metaphors are we must look not only (or even 
primarily) at their cognitive content or logical structure, but at how they function or 
“what they are used to do.” (p. 1) According to Professor Wofford, metaphors are best 
understood and evaluated, not by seeing whether they are true or false propositionally, 
but by assessing “their usefulness or success” (p. 4) But what is the measure of 
“usefulness or success”? Apparently it is not pragmatic, at least not in a strictly Peircean 
sense, for the pragmatic measure of usefulness or success is whether the proposition in 
question is true or false in the long run. But Professor Wofford has made it clear that the 
usefulness of metaphors does not lie in their being true of false. To address this question, 
Professor Wofford turns to the work of Perelman in declaring the measure of success or 
usefulness to be adherence or, more explicitly, the degree of the audience’s adherence to 
the metaphor’s claim. However, we need to be careful here, for metaphors are not 
purported to make any ‘claims’ in any logical or cognitive sense. Instead metaphorical 
claims or utterances (or at least the ones that fall under the particular pattern that 
Professor Wofford is addressing here) are held to be rhetorical rather than logical in 
character. (p. 1) I’m not sure how some rhetoricians would react to this distinction, but 
we’ll take it as it appears to be intended. Metaphor (or at least those that fall under the 
pattern “A ιzə B”)  
 
is a radical (non-complex) rhetorical entity—a verbal stimulus—that works by (1) interjection of 
doubt, (2) inducement to re-notice, (3) alteration of meaning as a consequence of re-noticing, and 
(4) establishment of a new belief in the mind of the radical interpreter: a willingness to respond in 
a new way (p. 9). 
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 This brings us to our second interesting point, for while the purported purpose of 
metaphors is to “achieve adherence,” it is not the cognitive content of metaphors that 
does the work of achieving adherence. Instead, Professor Wofford suggests that 
metaphors function to bring about adherence by literally stimulating the listener to notice 
something that might otherwise have been overlooked. To this end, Professor Wofford 
situates metaphor within the Peircean account of doubt and belief. Put simply, metaphor 
is said to function in a way analogous to doubt by blocking or disarming some given 
belief in a way that stimulates or begins a process of inquiry. The adherence (or belief) 
that results from the inquiry fulfills the original purpose of the metaphor, whose sole or at 
least primary function is simply to bring about adherence between utter and audience 
through the inquiry it stimulates. 
 It is important to note here that in applying his Peircean model of doubt, Professor 
Wofford states that “Metaphorical utterances operate as a non-complex stimuli; therefore 
they cannot possibly possess cognitive content.” (p. 8) Thus, in his “paintbrush” 
metaphor, exposure to the metaphor is said to bring about a situation of doubt that gives 
rise to a process of inquiry which results (if resolvable) in a cognitive difference in our 
understanding of paintbrushes. In this process and in the new understanding (or 
adherence) that results, the “difference we experience, however, is not in the meanings of 
the terms of the metaphor but in our understanding of how paintbrushes work.” (p. 7) In 
other words, our understanding of how paint brushes work is said to be importantly 
distinct and different from the meaning of the terms that are used in the metaphor 
(including, presumably, the meaning of the term “paintbrush”).  
 Now this is an interesting interpretation of metaphors, but I’m not yet fully 
convinced that it works. Firstly, if we accept Professor Wofford’s account, then a 
metaphor of the pattern discussed could only work, function or stand as a metaphor as 
long as it stimulates inquiry. Once adherence is attained, an expression such as “a 
paintbrush is a pump” must henceforth cease to be a metaphor (for it no longer fulfills its 
doubtful, stimulating function). Since such metaphors exist only insofar as they stimulate 
inquiry, then many of the expressions that currently count as metaphors (including, 
presumably, “a paintbrush is a pump”) should not be considered metaphors in a proper 
sense of the term once a sufficient degree of adherence is attained. This seems 
problematic at some fundamental level and may hint at a reductio of the original claim. 
 Secondly, in reducing metaphor (in the sense discussed) solely to the role of 
“verbal stimulus,” Professor Wofford seems to assume, somewhat ironically, the 
correctness of the very structuralist accounts of meaning and cognitive content against 
which he is pitted. For Professor Wofford seems to treat the uses associated with a term 
(such as paintbrush) as if use (or what a thing does) was superfluous to meaning. I might 
suggest, however, that part of the problem with the structuralist account of metaphors 
may lie as much in the fact that they don’t include use (or what a thing does) as an 
essential, constitutive ingredient of meaning. Professor Wofford’s claim that metaphors 
have no cognitive content seems only to work on a structuralist interpretation of meaning 
(where the meaning of “painbrush” lies in its structuralist definition “as a tool consisting 
of a bundle of organic or synthetic bristles, held in place by a ferule and mounted on a 
wooden or plastic handle.” Professor Wofford adds that “Perhaps the dictionary 
definition would inform us that a paintbrush is used to apply paint to surfaces,” but he 
adds this as if it is superfluous to the structuralist definition of the term. (p. 6) If we 
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proceed from a more pragmatic instead of a structuralist account of meaning, however 
(where the meaning of a term includes its conceivable uses or functions) then the claim 
that metaphors have no cognitive content seems exaggerated to say the least. 
 I like Professor Wofford’s suggestion that metaphors may work to stimulate 
inquiry, or more precisely, that they may compel us to look anew at our situation by 
disrupting “commonsense assumptions.” (p. 8) But as suggestive as it is, there are times 
when his account strains a little at the seams. I have a suspicion that this is due, at least in 
part, to the Peircean model of doubt that he employs. For the attempt to cast metaphor in 
the role of stimulus on the model of doubt ends up draining metaphor of all its content, 
making any content it may have irrelevant to what it does. This is in effect to reduce 
metaphor to a mere mechanical cause (which is the essential status and role of doubt in 
the Peircean system), a non-cognitive, experiential mechanism. There may be something 
of this in the role that metaphor plays, but to reduce metaphor to this contentless function 
seems a little over the top.  
 To help supplement some of Professor Woffard’s claims while still preserving his 
initial insights, I want to suggest another Peircean model that might prove to be more 
fruitful, or at least worthy of further investigation in understanding the role and place of 
metaphor, namely, the forms of argumentation as such. In particular, I want to suggest 
that, rather than serving as mere stimulus following the model of doubt, metaphors might 
be better viewed as an early, almost primitive form of abduction, that is, an attempt to 
gain new understanding about the world by framing it (or at least certain relations within 
it) in a new, suggestive and hence stimulating light. Viewed as a kind of abduction or 
primitive hypothesis, metaphor might stand as a kind of guess or undeveloped insight into 
the nature of things that would indeed prompt us to rethink our assumptions and ‘re-
notice’ our “cumulative experience of the world,” but in and through its cognitive content 
instead of removed from it. Viewing metaphor as a form of abduction would satisfy 
Professor Woffard’s demand that it prompt us to, “at least tentatively, hold the 
truthfulness-in-the-situation of her interlocutor.” Viewing metaphors abductively as 
something that might be pregnant with undeveloped meanings and understandings would 
also explain how and why metaphors might prompt or stimulate someone to further 
investigate and test (using the methods of deductive implication and inductive 
examination against the known facts) the kind of claim being made. An abductive 
account of metaphor might also go a long way in accounting for failed metaphors, those 
which appear to be more meaningful and fruitful than they actually are. Viewing 
metaphor an the Peircean model of abduction might, in other words, satisfy all the things 
that Professor Wofford wants to say about metaphors while avoiding some of the 
seemingly problematic implications of his stimulus/doubt model.  
 Of course the claims and suggestions I am making here would themselves need to 
be developed and tested, but that is perfectly consistent with Professor Wofford’s lovely 
claim that “argument is less concerned with winning and more concerned with winning 
over.” (p. 5) Such testing is, as Professor Wofford’s work here attests, an essential aspect 
of any attempt to achieve a healthy adherence. 
 
          Link to paper 
